Ulster-scots is a contemporary case of ethnicity-building, materialising in Northern Ireland at the end of the twentieth century. As the "Troubles" began to be reinterpreted as being about cultural identity in the 1980s, avenues were sought through which to find a "Protestant-ness" comparative to the considerably more developed discourse of Irishness. It was at this point that Ulster-Scots emerged. While its initial decades were marked by derision, hostility, and resistance, it has gained considerable ground in recent years. This article outlines the development of Ulster-Scots from its beginnings in the late 1980s to the present. Utilising indepth interviews with a variety of current and historical actors, I contend that this development entailed three phases. First, grass-roots educationalists operated independently while unionist elites lobbied for official recognition. In a second phase, the official recognition and institutionalisation of Ulster-Scots in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement initiated a process wherein the Ulster-Scots Agency came to be established as the key player in the field. A third phase began in the early 2010s with the Agency establishing a monopoly over the processes of Ulster-Scots peoplehood-making.
Peoplehood Building
A multitude of definitions of, and distinctions between, different categories of peoplehood are found within the academic literature. Various distinctions between ethnic, national, racial, and other such categories (such as the conceptualisation of the nation as an ethnicity with a claim to statehood) and descriptions of their contents (such as language, culture, heritage, genes, physical features, shared values, and so on) exist and are utilised both societally and within the academic literature. However, as Brubaker (1996 Brubaker ( , 2004 has effectively argued, just because these 'groupist' distinctions are frequently employed by such actors does not mean we should uncritically adopt these as our units of analysis. Rather, the content of these discourses should be included within our analysis. Wacquant (2016, p. 1081) contends that this family of categorisations can be considered as subsets of "ethnicity,"
as ethnicity itself 'is defined by shifting and woolly criteria that operate inconsistently across institutional domains and levels of the class structure, such that it does not produce a coordinated alignment of boundaries in symbolic, social and physical space.' This is not to say that societal conceptualisations of these various categories are not important; only that what differentiates them is neither constant nor absolute.
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Rogers Smith (2003 Smith ( , 2015 offers a productive terminological and schematic way forward in this regard. Smith employs the term 'peoplehood' to encompass all forms of discourse where claims of being "a people" are made, ranging from small-scale organisations and local affiliations, through ethnic, national, and state identities, to international and universal affiliations. Given that differentiations between various forms of peoplehood are not pre-discursive, the maintenance of rigid boundaries between the study of the social construction of ethnicity, nationality, and other such forms is problematic. As such, regarding the particular case study in hand, I utilise theories of peoplehood-building originally intended for nationalism studies in order to analyse the construction process of a regional ethnic identity.
In this article, I utilise and build upon Hroch's (1985) A-B-C model of small nation formation. According to this model, national "revivals" develop by passing through three temporal phases. In the initial phase, the 'period of scholarly interest,' an association of concerned individuals, typically intellectuals, collect and study the (alleged) characteristics of the nation, such as its language, culture, and history (1985, pp. 22) . In the second phase, the 'period of patriotic agitation,' politically active groups lobby for greater public recognition of the national group and its idiosyncrasies (1985, p. 23) . These patriots function as the 'driving force' in the construction of a mass national movement, organising in combinations with others 'already dissatisfied with the limitation of interest to the antiquities of the land, the language and the culture,' and who share their desire for the 'spreading of national conscious among the people ' (1985, p. 23) . A third phase is reached with the rise of a national mass movement.
While Hroch's model remains both productive and influential (Maxwell, 2010) , his work is fundamentally groupist in its conception of nationalism. His analysis of the development of national movements largely assumes the basic building-blocks of the nationEthnicity Monopoly 6 its identity, cultural features, historical narrative, and so on -to be essentially concrete realities prior to the national scholarship which purports merely to unearth them. Critics of such approaches argue that these various features ought to be considered products of invention (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2012) and collage (Smith, 2003) . In contrast to such groupist approaches, Brubaker (2004, p. 13) argues for the necessity of critically analysing how such notions of communal difference come to be 'proposed, propagated, imposed, institutionalised, discursively articulated, organisationally entrenched, and generally embedded in multifarious forms of "governmentality"'.
Hroch is by no means alone in focusing on powerful actors and/or groups in the construction of ethnic and national identities. Wimmer (2013, p. 69) , for example, includes 'political mobilisation' as one of his key means of ethnic boundary making. According to Wimmer, both the powerful and subordinate actors have the potential to 'mobilize sections of a population in order to carry the weight of mass opinion into the public arena and to make their vision of the relevant ethnic divisions politically salient ' (2013, p. 69) . Rogers Smith (2003, p. 32 ) also contends that processes of peoplehood-building involve a variety of actors; however, he argues that such mobilisations include 'constrained, asymmetrical interactions between actual and would-be leaders of political communities and the potential constituents for whom they compete.' As such, processes of peoplehood-building involve both the asymmetric, top-down power of elites and the simultaneous restraint of such elites as to which peoplehoods and narratives they can utilise in articulating the "people" they aim to describe. For Smith (2003, p. 34) , these constraints include the pre-existing 'senses of membership, identity, and affiliation, with entrenched economic interests, political and religious benefits, historical and cultural attachments, and animosities' within the target population. As I discuss in more detail below, the rise of Ulster-Scots in Northern Ireland is very much in line with elite-centred descriptions of peoplehood-building. While both Ethnicity Monopoly 7 grassroots actors and political elites have played roles in its creation, the process of ethnic narrative production has been fundamentally asymmetric, structured by political, economic and bureaucratic power differentials.
In the case of Ulster-Scots, the separation of Hroch's phases A and B is problematic both temporally and in terms of the overlap in personnel (and their interests). Scholarly interest has at no point been politically neutral in its construction. The process of ethnicity exploration and collaging was -and continues to be -primarily undertaken and moulded by political-cum-cultural actors. If separable at all, the primary period of "scholarly interest" has largely followed, rather than preceded, successful agitation. It was not until Ulster-Scots was allocated political, financial, and bureaucratic power in the form of the Ulster-Scots Agency that such an undertaking was adopted in earnest.
An important difference between Ulster-Scots and the small nations utilised in Hroch's analysis is the political-economic structure in which it arose. Hroch overlays his A-B-C model upon several stages of political-economic development: pre/post bourgeois revolution and the rise of capitalism, the onset of the industrial revolution, and the rise of a working-class movement. In contrast, Ulster-Scots arose in the context of post-industrial capitalism, Thatcherite neoliberalism, and a civil-war economy. Between 1961 and 1991, the level of employment in the manufacturing sector in Northern Ireland had fallen by more than 70 per cent, 'while jobs in private services increased by 54% and employment in the public sector increased by a staggering 158%' (Shirlow and McGovern, 1996, p. 393) . By 1993, public financing from Westminster represented 35.8 per cent of Northern Ireland's GDP, and the lack of employment opportunities was buttressed by a disproportionately large public sector. By the early 1990s, parity-of-esteem financing of ethno-cultural projects had become one of the most dependable mechanisms to funnel grants to ethnopolitical bases. For Hroch (1985, p. 23) , Phase B is 'made possible by the establishment of objective relations of Ethnicity Monopoly 8 economic, political and other types'. As I discuss in more detail below, this was certainly the case for the rise of Ulster-Scots.
Hacker-Cordon and Miley (2007) outline four key mechanisms described in the constructionist literature around national consciousness: nation-building from below, from above, and two from the 'middle' (bureaucracy monopoly and education-indoctrination). The former two represent, respectively, conceptualising the production of a national consciousness as evolving out from "the people" in a bottom-up process, and, second, as being constructed by ruling elite in a top-down process. In the latter conception, national consciousness develops from the middle. Bureaucracy monopoly exists where certain forms of linguistic or cultural capital are rendered advantageous on the labour market, leading to the construction of a national consciousness. An alternative form of nation-building from the middle comes from education-indoctrination, through the establishment of a 'monopoly of legitimate education' (Hacker-Cordon and Miley, 2007; Gellner, 2008, p. 33) . In this article, I
contend that gaining a monopoly over the sphere of education marked a key turning point in the ascendency of the Ulster-Scots Agency. Gaining sole patronage over its development and spread, the Agency has achieved considerable control over the Ulster-Scots peoplehood narrative into the future. However, the control of the Agency over Ulster-Scots education renders it more commensurate with top-down, rather than middle-out, processes.
Having discussed the theoretical framework of the study, I now turn to the case study under consideration in this article: the Ulster-Scots movement.
Ulster-Scots
Ulster-Scots burst onto the Northern Irish political scene in the 1990s. It gained notoriety initially as a language, promoted as a long-subjugated dialect of Scots (Görlach, 2000) . The movement was also widely understood to be a conspicuous attempt to produce a Ethnicity Monopoly
9
Protestant linguistic equivalent of the Irish language (Mac Póilin, 1999; Níc Craith, 2000 Radford, 2001; Crowley, 2006; Gardner, 2015) . Its colloquial register and use of words previously considered to be local slang, combined with attempts to maximally differentiate its spelling from standard English (Mac Póilin, 1999) , rendered it open to media scorn (McCall, 2002) . However, the derision of Ulster-Scots is not merely a response to its "folksiness," but also to the apparent new-found interest many loyalists and unionists seemed to have suddenly developed in the fields of linguistics, cultural heritage and literary history. This opposition has been heightened further by the considerable flow of public finances apportioned to translation and funding.
For many of its promoters, however, ethnic identity and cultural practice have always been central to the Ulster-Scots movement. However, pursuing linguistic legitimacy was considered to be the most immediate and potentially fruitful tactic for gaining cultural and There have been many attempts to define cultural rights, but whenever they have done they've found the language aspect much easier to define than the cultural. So, what began as a process of cultural rights recognition ended up language rights recognition with some cultural rights attached. As they examined the issue and tried to define it, it got reversed in what was the original intention. So, we ended up with a model where to secure our cultural rights we had to go heavy on the language rights.
Hence, it has only been since Ulster-Scots gained linguistic recognition that it began to be promoted in earnest as an ethnic and cultural "revival." This said, even amongst promoters and supporters of Ulster-Scots, its nature remains a highly contested notion. As one interviewee stated, 'Through all your research I'd be surprised if any two people say the same thing' (Jane Wallace, Ulster-Scots Agency education officer). Broadly speaking, the division of interest between the cultural and the linguistic breaks down along class lines, with working-class engaging with the former and feeling alienated from the latter (McCall, 2002) .
In terms of linguistic ability in Northern Ireland, according to the 2011 census (NISRA, 2013a (NISRA, , 2013b [ Table 1 about here] Importantly, however, the level of Ulster-Scots linguistic ability does not necessarily correspond to the level of identification, and 'a knowledge of the language is neither necessary nor sufficient for a sense of Ulster-Scots identity' (Stapleton and Wilson, 2004, p. 571) . When the figures for Ulster-Scots linguistic ability are compared to that of espousing Ulster-Scots identity, the state of religious bifurcation becomes clearer. Comparing the figures for self-identification from a 2010 Omnibus survey (Carmichael, 2010) to those for linguistic ability from the 2011 Census provides a rough insight into this divide. Whereas the figure for self-identification among Protestants was considerably higher than that of linguistic ability, for Catholics it appears likely that Ulster-Scots linguistic ability and selfidentification are more closely aligned (see table 1 ). This would seem to suggest that, in the absence of linguistic ability, Ulster-Scots identity resonates almost exclusively with Protestants in Northern Ireland.
Thus far, we have discussed the theoretical framework for peoplehood building employed in this study and outlined the key parameters of Ulster-Scots. In the following sections, I briefly summarise the methods utilised in undertaking this research and subsequently outline the findings of the study.
Methods
This paper forms part of a larger project analysing the evolution, content, and political The data pertaining specifically to the historical development of the Ulster-Scots movement was utilised to develop this article.
Three Phases of Development
Ulster-Scots education has been established through three phases of development. The 
Phase One: Grass-Roots Education, Elite Lobbying
The idea of Ulster-Scots began to disseminate through certain unionist currents of thought in the late eighties and early nineties. The Ulster-Scots Language Society was formed in 1992, producing the first publication explicitly about, and partly written in, Ulster-Scots the following year (Níc Craith, 2003; Gardner, 2015) . In the final decade of the conflict, prior to the signing of the Agreement in 1998, there emerged a small number of grass-roots educators who began to teach Ulster-Scots in schools. These educators were varied in approach, independent in action, and multifarious in their interest in the subject. Although I ceasefires and the 1998 signing of the Agreement. The "two-community" model and the rhetoric of parity of esteem as central components of the peace process at the time meant that a "Protestant" language/culture to correspond to Irish(ness) was politically expedient (Gilligan, 2007) .
Subsequent to its creation in 1992, the Ulster-Scots Language Society began to produce its publication, Ullans, in which articles on Ulster-Scots heritage, culture and politics, linguistic and literary history, and new poetry, prose and translations from English were printed (Gardner, 2015) . The funding bodies didn't want to recognise us and didn't want to include us. We ended up with our own Agency because they wanted to basically just shove us in there and get us away from them. But … when somebody says you're now going to get a million pounds spent on you, it's a bit difficult to say, you know, what about all the other ones who aren't spending tuppence on us. That has actually proven to be a longer-term problem where Ulster-Scots go to the Ulster-Scots Agency whereas Irish can go everywhere. We've been sort of pigeonholed in terms of recognition and funding.
Indeed, perceived inequalities in funding and recognition between Ulster-Scots and Irish under consociational democratic governance have been a repeated source for claims of cultural discrimination by unionists and promoters of Ulster-Scots. However, the centralisation of Ulster-Scots activities into a single governmental agency, alongside the comparative newness of Ulster-Scots in the sphere of language and culture, has rendered it comparatively much more organisationally concentrated than Irish.
In sum, this initial phase of peoplehood construction involved multiplicity in UlsterScots. A variety of differing conceptualisations of it arose, and aspirations for it were diverse.
While disparate grass-roots educators taught Ulster-Scots according to their own interpretations and emphases, unionist elites lobbied for official recognition. With the success of the latter in achieving its inclusion in the post-conflict governmental structure, UlsterScots entered a new phase in its development.
Phase Two: Centralisation
The establishment of the Ulster-Scots Agency in 1999 produced a situation in which a fledgeling ethnic "revivalist" movement without a wide-spread base of popular support was apportioned considerable political and economic power. No mass movement preceded its instalment; on the contrary, vocal opposition to the idea of Ulster-Scots was widespread, even among much of its target population. Nor did there exist an established notion of what UlsterScots should include. Its contours were unclear, and its core features rather multifarious.
As a result of the Agency's response to the situation it found itself in, this second phase in the development of Ulster-Scots involved three core elements: patriotic agitation, peoplehood scholarship, and centralisation. First, in the wake of its establishment, the Agency set about the business of increasing Ulster-Scots' recognition, legitimisation and spread in identification at both official-legal and societal levels. Essentially, in Hrochian terms, the Agency began a process of 'patriotic agitation', campaigning for the societal recognition of Ulster-Scots culture, language, heritage, music and dance, and identity. Importantly, the Agency aimed to raise awareness not only at a broad societal level, but specifically among those whom they consider to be Ulster-Scots, practice its culture, and/or are native speakers.
A second core element of this second phase was the engagement in peoplehood scholarship. By "peoplehood scholarship" I mean something similar to what Hroch (1985, p. 22) terms 'scholarly interest': the engagement in exploration, documentation, and systematisation of the nature, content, key features, and narrative of the sense of peoplehood in question (Hroch, 1985; Smith, 2003 Smith, , 2015 . However, where Hroch viewed this as a process of description, I contend that the process is far from mere discovery. Even though the actors themselves may believe in earnest that their activities merely represent a process of "finding" the features of the identity (and this certainly was the case for my participants), this process is, in fact, one of creative accumulation and collaging. It involves the amalgamation of various societal and historical features which can be legitimately claimed as being associated with the identity in question (Smith, 2003 (Smith, , 2015 "Through all your research I'd be surprised if any two people say the same thing."
As described earlier, the Ulster-Scots case proceeded rather differently to Hroch's schema in terms of temporality. Unlike in Hroch's depiction, the phase of 'scholarly interest' did not precede its 'patriotic agitation' but occurred in parallel, often undertaken by the same actors. In other words, it was not (only) independent scholars who engaged in peoplehood scholarship, but politically active agents. Furthermore, with the dissemination of awareness of Ulster-Scots as the Agency's central remit, peoplehood scholarship became professionalised, backed by governmental and financial support. In conjunction with having the economic and institutional structures to undertake this practice, the Agency had been rendered the official voice for Ulster-Scots. As such, the power to set the Ulster-Scots peoplehood narrative became asymmetrically structured. Its peoplehood scholarship had become institutionally centralised.
Third, and relatedly, this phase witnessed the gradual centralisation by the Agency of a broad spectrum activities which could legitimately be claimed as Ulster-Scots. Through this period, they began to provide funding for festivals, educational events, and community groups which the Agency deemed to be within the scope of Ulster-Scots culture, language, and heritage. The Agency also became particularly active and interested in the sphere of education, as it offered the potential not only to reach the next generation, but also to gain ground among the broader population.
In 1999 The Protestant, unionist community did what it always does, and that is: when it thinks the Dublin government is against it, then it must be alright. … I'm putting it very crudely, but that is it. If we could show that the Irish government were totally against what we were doing, then we were on the road to success, and the road to However, in a turn common among Ulster-Scots promoters (Gardner, 2017) , its low take-up rates were explained by an alleged 'cultural characteristic of the Ulster-Scots community' of being 'quite relaxed, quite laid back.'
Contrarily, other interviewees from the Agency described methods taken to overcome a widespread suspicion and resistance they encounter within schools. These interviewees discussed the use of promotional events of various kinds in order to gain the trust of teachers of parents, as well as the interest of pupils. Gary Blair, an education officer in the Agency, Ulster-Scots from the earliest days tae modernity. … I think it opened the eyes o' teachers I think every bit as much if not mair 11 than the pupils. They were so taken by the content, and it made Ulster-Scots safe, and it made Ulster-Scots interesting, and it made it educationally inviting.
It was through this period of public relations that the Ulster-Scots Agency began to gain ground in terms of school-based engagement. DCAL, 2014; Northern Ireland Executive, 2008) . In terms of public engagement, perhaps the most effective area was found to be in the field of education. While developments in this area were relatively gradual, they laid the groundwork for the production and implementation of the large-scale, centrally coordinated educational schemes of the 2010s. At this point, the Ulster-Scots movement entered a third phase in which the Agency gained unequivocal dominance in the process of peoplehood-building and a monopoly over education.
Phase Three: Ethnicity Monopoly
Since the early 2010s, the Ulster-Scots Agency has gained a monopoly over UlsterScots peoplehood. Where the second phase involved the coexistence of parallel and multifarious Ulster-Scots projects, the third phase is characterised by the ascendancy of the Subjects offered in the Flagship scheme include history and heritage, culture, literature and poetry, theatrical performance, language, and music and dance. By the spring of 2014, a small number of primary schools had received the Flagship Schools Award, and a further forty-four were either working towards it or on the waiting list having applied to join (UlsterScots Agency, no date; Campbell, Eydmann and Gunn, 2013; NSMC, 2013) .
The Ulster-Scots Flagship scheme marked a turning point in the educational monopolisation of the Agency over the Ulster-Scots peoplehood narrative and discourse.
Grass-roots Ulster-Scots educators were joined by others who relied much more heavily on the Agency for teaching, materials, and information. Almost all of the teachers from UlsterScots Flagship schools interviewed for this research were in the latter category, most of whom expressed having little to no prior knowledge of Ulster-Scots before engaging with the Agency. While almost all such teachers expressed a sense that it reflected the culture of the school's "community", many of the primary rationales provided for joining the Ulster-Scots
Flagship project were economic. In the context of austerity, the free educational services offered by the Agency were viewed as means of alleviating restraints in school budgets.
Ulster-Scots education in these schools was undertaken almost exclusively by the Agency. As
Ms Anderson, a participating teacher from a Flagship school explained, her approach was to 'let the children learn about their culture … from the professionals, as such, rather than us.'
As school engagement began to increase rapidly through the 2010s, the Agency began to expand its aims. Trina Somerville, the Agency's Director of Education and Language, described their recent turn toward a more assertive strategy.
We're at the stage where we're talking to the Department of Education, we're going to be meeting CCEA, and we're going to be looking then to say you need to get the message out to schools to say this has to happen, this is happening. Because, you know, its fine for us to look at courses and to look at subjects where it can be embedded, but we need the buy-in and the support from the department of education saying: yes, this is good -this has to be done. (Meredith, 2012) ; however, interviewees at the Agency recognised this as a somewhat distant ambition. Nonetheless, dominance in the arena of peoplehood-building has been firmly established by the Agency, having consolidated its position as the sole body providing Ulster-Scots educational services. In doing so, it has gained a monopoly over the knowledge and narratives about Ulster-Scots within schools: a step in the direction of 'education-indoctrination' in peoplehood production (Hacker-Cordon and Miley, 2007) .
It would appear that grass-roots actors within the Ulster-Scots movements have been largely excluded, pushed to the margins, or assimilated into the Agency. Grass-roots educationalists interviewed as part of this research expressed feelings of alienation toward to Agency and concern over its orientation. Mr Robertson contended that he had 'very little faith in the Ulster-Scots Agency,' critiquing it for its alleged disorganisation, financial mismanagement, and conceptualisation of Ulster-Scots. As he saw it, the problem with the Agency is that 'they want to politicise it and make it Protestant.' Willie Drennan also expressed a variety of concerns regarding both the running of the Agency and its approach to Ulster-Scots. Regarding the former, he viewed the organisation as overly 'top-down' in its approach, excluding non-Agency voices: 'they're the "experts", and I'm just a boy on the ground, you know'. In relation to the content of Ulster-Scots, Drennan critiqued the Agency for what he perceived as a disconnect between the "real" cultural history of the region and the official version of Ulster-Scots being promoted by the Ulster-
It's all sort of … plastic paddie. … It's fair enough that they would promote Scottish In other words, Drennan felt that the ideology underpinning the principles of peoplehood scholarship undertaken by the Agency differed from his own approach, silencing alternative peoplehood narratives.
Due to a variety of disagreements between Drennan, the Agency, and the unionist In sum, since the early 2010s, the Ulster-Scots movement has become a highly centralised and institutionalised project, with the Agency holding a monopoly over the process of ethnicity-making. Although the institutional structures necessary for this ethnicity monopolisation were established with the GFA and the subsequent creation of the UlsterScots Agency, it was not until the early 2010s that the latter established the scope of their activities, gained dominance in the sphere of Ulster-Scots peoplehood-making activities, and achieved the operational capacity necessary for their monopolisation of the field. With
Ulster-Scots education now entirely under the jurisdiction of the Agency, it wields considerable power to write the Ulster-Scots peoplehood narrative for the next generation, as well as to render it normative as a conception of group boundaries in Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
This article has provided an in-depth analysis of a contemporary case of ethnicitybuilding. From this research, I suggest that two tentative lessons may be deduced for the study of peoplehood-building processes. First, the substantive elements of Hroch's three phases were found to be useful in considering the rise of a peoplehood. These elements are:
scholarly interest, patriotic agitation, and mass movement. Drawing on the work of Rogers Smith (2003 Smith ( , 2015 , as well as that of Hroch, I use the term "peoplehood scholarship" to describe the process of inventive collage through which various cultural features, both historical and current, are "discovered" to be elements of the identity under question. For
Ulster-Scots, this has largely involved uncovering and appropriating a broad spectrum of local features which have resulted from the connections between the province of Ulster and Scotland.
Second, Hroch's conceptualisation of peoplehood-building as developing through temporal phases was also found to be effective. Certain moments and turning points in the lifespan of peoplehood projects establish new realities and shift the potentialities for their development and dissemination. For Ulster-Scots, these turning points were its inclusion in Northern Ireland's peace accord and post-conflict institutional structure at the end of the 1990s, and the firm establishment of the Agency's monopoly over the peoplehood narrative in the early 2010s. However, it is important to point out that the precise phases which Hroch Ethnicity Monopoly 29 outlined were not found to be the case for Ulster-Scots. Scholarly interest did not precede patriotic agitation, nor were these activities undertaken necessarily by different actors.
Rather, these features occurred simultaneously, with peoplehood scholarship gaining considerable pace after the creation of the Agency. In fact, locating and appropriating allegedly "Ulster-Scots" features -its cultural characteristics, historical figures, heritage objects, standardised linguistic rules, ethnic idiosyncrasies, and so on -became a necessity for its everyday functioning.
Hence, drawing upon Hroch's model, I suggest that outlining turning points and phases is an effective strategy for modelling the processes of peoplehood-building, specifically focusing on the variety of competing peoplehood conceptualisations produced, the mechanisms through which certain versions become dominant while others are excluded, the political and social outcomes of patriotic agitation, and the different structural positions from which peoplehood scholarship is undertaken. Smith (2003) rightly points out the need to analyse power asymmetries in peoplehood-making. In line with this approach, this research suggests that describing the evolution and formation of such asymmetries will be effective for explaining how certain notions of collective identity come to be rendered hegemonic.
The Ulster-Scots movement has resulted in a highly centralised, top-down structure, with the Agency exercising a monopoly over the definition of its content and contours.
Furthermore, having become the only player in the production of Ulster-Scots education, the Agency has gained a 'monopoly of legitimate education' (Hacker-Cordon and Miley, 2007; Gellner, 2008, p. 33) . As the influence of the Agency continues to grow, and its reach extends, Ulster-Scots peoplehood may yet become an unquestioned discourse, or even an ethno-cultural "mass movement."
